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Empiricism is one of the most distinctive features of Brentano’s work as a whole (see CHAP. 
3).1 “Experience alone is my teacher”, he declared on the opening page of his Psychology 
from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1874: 1/1973a: xxvii). In very general terms, this 
suggests that his philosophy gives some priority to appearances over objective reality, to the 
first-person over the third-person perspective. My suggestion in what follows is that 
Brentano’s aim in the Psychology was basically to consolidate his empiricism through a 
theory of appearance, and that this theory of appearance is identical with his theory of 
intentionality. I will here discuss two aspects of this view. First, I will argue that Brentano 
offers an empirical or phenomenological definition of intentionality. Secondly, my claim will 
be that his theory of intentionality is basically an epistemological theory. 
1. Empiricism 
Brentano’s empiricism has two distinct components. The first is the view that all knowledge, 
including psychological knowledge, is based on experience; the second is the view that all 
concepts derive from experience. Brentano’s theory of intentionality is an empirical theory 
insofar as it fulfills both conditions. Let us examine this point in a little more detail. 
Regarding the first view, it is important to note that Brentano, already in the Psychology, 
endorses a very strong version of empiricism. What he opposes is not only the speculative 
rationalism of Hegel and Schelling. He also challenges the Locke-style view that science 
provides indirect knowledge of substances through their appearances (Brentano 1874: 
28/1973a: 19; Brentano 1979: 5ff.; Brentano 1986: 121-2; see also Haller 1989, Potrč 1997). 
Maybe, he argues, physical phenomena are really caused by things existing in the outside 
world. However, this does not entail that there holds between them a relation of similarity in 
virtue of which phenomenological knowledge provides (indirect) objective knowledge. Even 
accepting that such a relation exists at the level of “spatial phenomena, shapes, and sizes”, the 
same can certainly not be said of many other phenomena that are also studied in physics, for 
example “the phenomena of light, sound, heat, spatial location and locomotion” (1874: 
28/1973a: 19). Knowing physical phenomena does not involve (indirectly) knowing bodies 
presumed to cause them. Physical phenomena are not such that there really exist bodies that 
appear in or through them. Rather, if there exist any such bodies (physical substances) in the 
external world, they simply don’t appear at all: “That which truly exists does not come to 
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appearance, and that which appears does not truly exist” (1874: 28/ 1973a: 19). In short: all 
knowledge has as its objects – all scientific theories actually refer to – phenomena and only 
phenomena. For this reason, some commentators have suggested that Brentano’s position in 
his Psychology is a form of phenomenalism, namely an epistemological or methodological 
phenomenalism (Tolman 1987, Pacherie 1993: 13, Simons 1995, Crane 2006, Seron 2014). 
The implications of this are straightforward. As is well known, intentionality is used in the 
Psychology to define psychology (see this volume, CHAP. 4). In opposition to other 
philosophers and psychologists of the time – especially Wundt, the positivists, and the neo-
Kantians – Brentano thought that the sciences differ from one another not primarily by their 
methods, but by their objects, and that defining psychology consequently involves defining 
the mental. Since science in general must refer to phenomena and only phenomena, the 
question is, What is a mental phenomenon? “Our aim,” says Brentano, “is to clarify the 
meaning of the two terms ‘physical phenomenon’ and ‘mental phenomenon’, removing all 
misunderstanding and confusion concerning them” (1874: 111/1973a: 78). Within the flux of 
what we experience, some phenomena we are aware of have distinctive features that suffice to 
qualify them as “mental”. According to Brentano, intentional directedness is such a feature: 
necessarily, every mental phenomenon is representational and vice versa (1874: 124-5/1973a: 
88-9). 
Let us now turn to the second view: all concepts derive from experience (Brentano 1929: 
139). According to Brentano, this can be understood in two different ways (Brentano 1976: 
3/1988: 1). In a first sense, an empirical concept is a primitive concept directly abstracted 
from experience. In a second sense, a concept is said to be empirical insofar as it is defined in 
terms of primitive concepts thus conceived. For example, the concept of a “four-dimensional 
topoid” is certainly not taken directly from experience, but it is empirical insofar as it is a 
combination of, say, the concepts “four”, “spatial coordinate”, and “shape”, which are directly 
taken from experience. 
For the sake of convenience, we may call concepts of the first kind “observational” and 
concepts of the second kind “theoretical”. My contention is that, for Brentano, intentionality 
falls into the second category. In other words: intentionality is not an observational concept, 
but a compound of observational concepts, hence a concept that is to be defined through 
observational concepts. Brentano never used the word “intentionality”, nor did he use the 
word "intentional” in the sense of “intentionally directed toward something”. He used instead 
the term “relation to a content” (1874: 124/1973a: 88). Thus, my aim in the following pages is 
to show that both “relation” and “content” here are to be taken as observational concepts. 
2. Intentionality empirically defined 
 
Now with this in mind, Brentano’s reasoning in the Psychology is simply as follows. First, 
psychology is defined as the “science of mental phenomena”, with the consequence that 
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defining what psychology is requires defining what a mental phenomenon is. Secondly, 
according to Brentano’s intentionality thesis – necessarily all mental phenomena are 
representational and vice versa –, mental phenomena are to be defined in terms of 
intentionality. Thirdly and finally, intentionality is not a primitive term and still needs to be 
defined. As a result, the ultimate goal is to define intentionality, namely to define it using 
concepts that are directly abstracted from experience. 
For Brentano as for most empiricist philosophers of his time, defining is not merely clarifying 
what a word means and how it should be used, but also, and more importantly, indicating 
what it actually refers to. The relation of equivalence between the definiendum and the 
definiens means that the actual objects of the concept to be defined must be those objects 
which the defining concepts directly refer to. And since intentionality is an empirical concept, 
these objects must be experiential data. In this sense, the definition required must be a 
phenomenological definition of intentionality (hereafter PDI). As I will try to show, such a 
definition is the core of Brentano’s theory of intentionality in the 1874 Psychology. 
Since psychology is the science of mental phenomena, and mental phenomena are essentially 
representational, it is to be expected that most of the psychologist’s judgments will be 
expressible by sentences with intentional verbs. Accordingly, the question of what the objects 
of psychology are is equivalent to the question of what sentences of the form “R represents A” 
refer to. For example, a psychologist affirms that a subject imagines Peter Pan. The question 
is, What are the objects of this judgment? What does the sentence refer to? When you accept 
it as true that the subject imagines Peter Pan, are you committed to the existence of Peter Pan? 
Or to the existence of the subject? Or to neither (or both)?  
In a sense, this is a question of “deep grammar”. Another way to express the same idea is to 
say that intentional sentences may be referentially misleading and need to be rephrased. 
Defining what an intentional fact is requires rephrasing sentences of the form “R represents 
A” in such a way as to make apparent the objects actually referred to. Debates about 
Brentano’s theory of intentionality are of course rife (see CHAP. 4). Here is what I believe to 
be Brentano’s rephrasing of “R represents A” and hence his definition of intentionality: 
(PDI) For all x, x is a representation of A iff x appears and x (really) exists and A does not 
(really) exist and A appears in x.2 
Put more simply: something is an intentional act and hence a mental phenomenon if, and only 
if, it (really) exists and something else that does not (really) exist appears in it. In other words, 
“x and A appear” is synonymous with “x and A are phenomena” or “x and A are phenomenally 
conscious” (in the intransitive sense of the term) or “x and A are subjectively experienced”. 
More precisely: x is a mental phenomenon, A is a physical or mental phenomenon. 
The overall idea behind (PDI) is fairly intuitive. It is that appearing does not involve existing. 
Many things appear in your mind, and among them some exist, some do not. When you 
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imagine Peter Pan, what appears to you, what you experience, is both Peter Pan and your 
imagining Peter Pan. Peter Pan does not need to exist for you to imagine Peter Pan – it is a 
“mere appearance”. But your imagining Peter Pan must exist, otherwise you would not 
imagine Peter Pan. 
All the conditions on the right hand side of the biconditional can easily be found in the 1874 
edition of the Psychology (Brentano 1874: 14, 114, 124-132/1973a: 10, 81, 88-94).3 The most 
important point for our purposes is that the definiens is only about phenomena and their 
phenomenal properties. The primitive terms are “appears”, “exists”, and “appears in”, which 
are observational concepts in the sense indicated above. 
Several things should be noted here. 
First, (PDI) is obviously false if inner perception is a form of representation.  For in this case, 
A should be the mental act itself and hence be identical with x, with the consequence that x 
should be said to exist and not exist at the same time. For reasons I cannot go into here, I 
think that inner perception is not a form of representation in the contemporary sense of the 
word, that is, a mental act that has a “content”. In my view, what corresponds to inner 
perception in (PDI) is the verb “… appears”.4 
Secondly, the condition “A does not exist” clearly serves as a criterion for marking off the 
intentional content A from other parts of the mental act x which are not represented by x. For 
example, both the represented thunder and the auditory perception of it are parts of the act of 
feeling scared when hearing thunder. But they differ from each other by the fact that the 
former, unlike the latter, does not need to exist for the whole act to exist. 
Thirdly, the conjunction “A does not exist and A appears in x” corresponds to what Brentano – 
ambiguously – calls “intentional in-existence” (intentionale Inexistenz). That the intentional 
object “intentionally in-exists” means that it is merely “intentional” in the late-medieval sense 
of the term, namely a mere appearance in the mind. It is thus noteworthy that Brentano uses 
the term “intentional existence” interchangeably with “phenomenal existence” (1874: 
129/1973a: 92). 
Fourthly and finally, the condition “A appears in x” turns out to be central for understanding 
what intentionality means for Brentano. Intentionality is not a metaphysical relation between 
mind and world; it is better seen as a pheno-mereological relation in virtue of which some 
phenomena appear in our mind as having a content, that is, as containing in themselves 
another phenomenon which does not exist. Both kinds of phenomena are, strictly speaking, 
appearances in the mind, and thus the relation between them is, as Brentano says, a purely 
“mental relation” (Brentano 1911: 133ff./1973a: 271ff.). That is why Brentano claims that 
psychology is also concerned with physical phenomena, as far as they are conceived as 
contents – as psychological features – of mental phenomena (Brentano 1874: 140/1973a: 
100). Nonetheless, mental phenomena – phenomena that include within them other 
phenomena that do not exist – are the proprietary subject matter of psychology. 
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“All phenomena,” claims Brentano, “are to be called ‘inner’ because they all belong to one 
reality, be it as constituents or as correlates” (Brentano 1982: 129/1995b: 137). In Brentano’s 
view, a phenomenon is something that occurs in one’s mind in such a way that one is 
acquainted with it through perception. Since all objects of perception are phenomena, it 
follows from this that all perception, even so-called outer perception, is in some sense “inner” 
(Brentano 1874: 128/1973a: 91; Brentano 1982: 129/1995b: 137). Accordingly, “the objects 
of the so-called external perception… demonstrably do not exist outside of us. In contrast to 
that which really and truly exists, they are mere phenomena” (1874: 14/1973a: 10). 
3. A phenomenological approach to the problem of intentionality 
The main benefit of this approach, in my view, is that it offers an intuitive solution to the so-
called “problem of intentionality”, or at least to some version of it. Roughly, the problem of 
intentionality arises from the fact that some representations seem to represent both something 
and nothing. On the one hand, your representation of Peter Pan is about something, namely 
Peter Pan rather than Robin Wood. On the other hand, Peter Pan does not exist and so there is 
nothing your representation is about. The problem clearly resides in the relational character of 
intentional verbs, namely in the fact that they grammatically require an object and, at the same 
time, are often used to express intentional states that have no object. Crane (2001: 23; cf. 
Kriegel 2007: 307-8) analyzes the problem using the following three propositions: 
(PI1) For all x, if x represents A, then x stands in a relation to A. 
(PI2) For all x, if x stands in a relation to A, then A exists. 
(PI3) There exists an x such that x represents A and A does not exist. 
The conjunction of (PI1) and (PI2) implies that 
(PI4) for all x, if x represents A, then A exists. 
The problem lies in the fact that each of the three propositions (PI1-3) seems true 
individually, but that the conjunction of (PI4) and (PI3) is necessarily false. 
The Brentanian strategy for solving the problem of intentionality becomes apparent if, as 
prescribed in (PDI), we substitute each occurrence of “x represents A” with the equivalent 
sentence “x appears and x exists and A does not exist and A appears in x”. We then obtain the 
following propositions: 
(PI1*) For all x, if x appears and x exists and A does not exist and A appears in x, then x stands 
in a relation to A. 
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(PI2) For all x, if x stands in a relation to A, then A exists. 
(PI3*) There exists an x such that x appears and x exists and A appears in x and A does not 
exist. 
There are at least two things worth noting here. First, (PI1*) is a tautology, since “… appears 
in…” denotes a relation. Secondly, the conjunction of (PI1*) and (PI2*), at least at first 
glance, implies a contradiction, namely: 
(PI4*) for all x, if x appears and x exists and A does not exist and A appears in x, then A exists. 
Since the problem of intentionality lies in the apparent inconsistency of (PI1-3), one may be 
tempted to conclude that Brentano’s phenomenological approach leaves it unsolved. 
However, I think there is a flaw in this line of reasoning. My suggestion is that the phrase “… 
appears in…” actually introduces something fundamentally new, which requires us to 
approach the problem in quite a different way. 
The key point is that, although “… appears in…” certainly denotes a relation, that relation is 
not of the usual kind. Suppose you hallucinate a ghost in armor standing in the doorway. The 
ghost appears to you as do the doorway and the armor. Moreover, it is true that he appears in 
the doorway and in armor. However, “the ghost is in the doorway” and “the ghost is in armor” 
do not imply that the ghost or his armor exist. In consequence, (PI2) is false: some relations 
are such that some or even all of their relata do not exist, and this is the case with “… appears 
in…”. In some sense, both relata are required for the ghost and the doorway to stand in the 
relation “… appears in…”. But this simply means that both relata must appear (not exist) for 
the relation to appear. (PI2) is certainly true of real relations, but it is not true of purely 
phenomenal relations: “… appears in…” is not a relation such that, if x stands in a relation to 
y, then y exists. 
Most importantly, this is not just a stipulation required in order to accommodate the fact that 
some representations have no object. Rather, this is just how we use appearance words in 
ordinary language. In this respect, Brentano’s phenomenological approach to the 
intentionality problem may be considered more intuitive than the approach using intentional 
verbs (Seron, forthcoming). 
Brentano conceives of intentionality as a “relation to a content” (1874: 124/1973a: 88). 
However, this “mental relation”, although similar to real relations, is not a genuine relation 
and one could even doubt whether it is really fit to be called a relation.5 The reason for this, 
Brentano argues, is that the mental relation can obtain even if one of its relata does not exist: 
If someone thinks of something, the one who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his 
thinking need not exist at all.… The only thing which is required by mental reference is the person 
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thinking. The terminus of the so-called relation does not need to exist in reality at all. (Brentano 
1911: 134/1973a: 272) 
It is clear that, once intentionality is construed as involving no real relation, that is, no relation 
such that it cannot obtain unless all its relata exist, the so-called “problem of intentionality” 
ceases to be a problem at all. Indeed, the conjunction of (PI1) and (PI2) no longer implies 
(PI4). From the fact that intentionality is a phenomenal relation and all real relations are such 
that their existence necessarily entails that of all their relata, it does not follow that 
intentionality is such that its existence necessarily entails that of all its relata. As a result, the 
conjunction of (PI1) and (PI2) is consistent with (PI3). The phenomenological approach to 
intentionality makes this solution more intuitive insofar as it makes more intuitive the view 
that some relations can obtain in the absence of one or more of their relata. 
4. Brentano’s theory of intentionality as an epistemological theory 
The condition “A appears (in x) and does not exist” – intentional in-existence – has to do with 
what philosophers call “representational opacity”. Just as “S has a representation of A” does 
not entail that there exists something that is represented by S and is identical to A, so “A 
appears” does not entail that there exists something that appears and is identical to A. But 
what is important here is that, once phenomenologically construed, intentional in-existence is 
no more a puzzling logical feature of intentional verbs, but is normally allowed by the 
grammar of appearance words. 
To some extent, the above suggests an adverbial theory of intentionality (Moran 1996). The 
claim that intentionality is not a real relation may be taken to mean that “… represents A” is 
not a relational, but a one-place predicate. To put it otherwise: the belief that you have a 
representation of A commits you only to the existence of your representation with its 
psychological properties, and being about A is just one of these properties. However, 
Brentano’s view actually involves something more. 
According to (PDI), a mental act consists in a combination of two phenomena, of which one 
exists and the other does not. A mental act is basically this: a mental phenomenon appears in 
such a way that something else, its “content” or “primary object”, appears in it. As we have 
just seen, this content is ontologically speaking nothing more than the act’s property of being 
about this or that. As Husserl claims in the Logical Investigations, the intentional content 
exists in the act in the same way as the red exists in the red stripe (Husserl 1984: 105-
106/2001: 230; Husserl 1979: 157). 
A highly paradoxical consequence of this is that judgments are not made true by the primary 
object they are about. The psychologist talks about her past mental states. The physicist talks 
about colors, shapes, temperatures. None of these things really exist, they are mere 
appearances. Yet some physical or psychological theories are really true. So what makes them 
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true if they are about mere appearances? Mere appearances do not exist and thus cannot make 
anything true! 
Assuming that scientific theories refer not to external reality, but only to appearances in the 
mind, how is it possible for them to be true? The challenge is twofold. As a phenomenalist, 
Brentano must deny, for example, that the natural scientist’s judgment that some owls are 
brown is made true by physical substances to which it should correspond. As a “science of 
physical phenomena”, physics has no other objects than (physical) appearances in the mind. 
However, unlike other phenomenalists, Brentano does not consider such judgments to be 
illusory, or physical knowledge as such to be impossible: it is true – in the sense of what 
Brentano sometimes calls “phenomenal truth” (Brentano 1985: 169) – that some owls are 
brown. So what makes them true? Brentano’s view is that the judgment’s truthmaker is 
neither its primary object nor any extra-phenomenal substance. All that we have is its 
secondary object, namely the mental act the natural scientist presently experiences. 
Accordingly, there is a sense in which Brentano’s theory of intentionality is an 
epistemological theory, in the sense that its purpose is to establish the validity of the empirical 
sciences, that is, of sciences whose objects are only mere phenomena. Brentano tries to 
demonstrate that a science can yield truths even if its objects are mere phenomena. And his 
solution is as follows: the natural scientist can say true things about physical phenomena, but 
she ought to know that she actually refers only to present mental phenomena, for example to 
her remembering of the owl. The upshot of this is that 
If we investigate what it means to say the color is not known as actually existing, but as 
phenomenally existing, it becomes clear that in the final analysis I do not know that a color 
exists, but that I have a presentation of the color, that I see it... Hence it follows that we do not 
really recognize that which is known as the “object”, what we recognize is only the mentally 
active being who has it as his object... It is certain that neither we nor any other being who 
grasps something with direct evidence as a fact can have anything but himself as the object of 
his knowledge. (Brentano 1928: 4-6/1981b: 5-6) 
This view may be regarded as a variant of the “thesis of the relativity of knowledge” 
(defended, among others, by Lotze and Hamilton).6 “The truth of physical phenomena,” 
Brentano claims in the 1874 Psychology, “is only a relative truth” (1874: 28/1973a: 19). The 
owls that the knowledge that some owls are brown is about are no more than “correlates” that 
appear in the mental act. 
As Brentano put it in the late 1880s, the owls are presented “in an oblique mode” (in modo 
obliquo) as brown.7 The oblique mode corresponds to intentional aboutness, while the real 
reference, the existing object that is presented in a direct mode (in modo recto), is the present 
mental act. The empirical scientist’s judgments rest upon oblique presentations. The idea is 
that, although owls are mere appearances, they can be truly ascribed objective properties 
through a non-referential use of language (cf. Parsons 2004: 179-80). Again, this non-
referential use is in line with our ordinary use of appearance words. We obviously can, in 
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virtue of the grammar of appearance words, say true things about appearances that do not 
exist, for example “The ghost appears to me in armor”. 
Importantly, this should apply to psychology as well. For the method of empirical psychology 
is inner observation through memory, and memory is a variety of oblique presentation 
(Brentano 1928: 38ff.; Dewalque 2014: 68-9). Affirming or knowing that you felt angry a 
moment ago involves accepting as existent not your past feeling – which indeed no longer 
exists – but your present memory of having felt angry. Your anger is what your judgment is 
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1911: 34/1973a: 198). The view proposed here does not rule out the possibility for the mental 
act to be represented, in the contemporary sense of the word. A mental act can have a mental 
act as its intentional content. In this case, however, Brentano’s view is that the act being 
represented must be numerically different from the act that represents it. The represented act 
is a past act – an act which no longer exists really and whose only “existence” is its appearing 
in one’s mind. Of course, (PDI) is not self-contradictory when applied to self-representation 
thus conceived, namely as a representation of a numerically distinct representation. 
5 Katalin Farkas (2013) has proposed to construe intentionality as an “apparent directedness”. 
I think this is exactly what Brentano had in view when he characterized intentionality as a 
“mental relation”. Brentano’s use of the term “relation”, however, is rather ambiguous. He 
sometimes regards intentionality as a special kind of relation (Brentano 1928: 42/1981b: 31; 
Brentano 1985: 167ff.), sometimes as something that is not really a relation at all, but an 
appearance of a relation (Brentano 1911: 133ff./1973a: 271ff.). 
6 Cf. Hamilton 1859: 96-7: “All human knowledge, consequently … all human philosophy, is 
only of the relative or phenomenal. In this proposition, the term relative is opposed to the 
term absolute; and, therefore, in saying that we know only the relative, I virtually assert that 
we know nothing absolute, – nothing existing absolutely; that is, in and for itself, and without 
relation to us and our faculties.… It is only in its qualities, only in its effects, in its relative or 
phenomenal existence, that <the object> is cognizable or conceivable.” The terms “correlate” 
and “phenomenal existence” commonly used by Brentano are clearly Hamiltonian. 
7 Brentano (Ms 13.029[1] at the Graz archives, in Brentano 2010) explains the relation 
between relativity and obliqueness as follows: “Something that is designated in a relative 
manner is something that is determined in relation to something else. Relative names are 
names in which, besides the named object, another object is named in obliquo.” See also 
Brentano 1874: 134ff./1973a: 272ff., Brentano 1985: 169, 174, De Libera 2011. 
 
